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CONTRACTING IN THE DARK: CASTING LIGHT ON 
THE SHADOWS OF SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
In the early days of the Internet, copyright owners concentrated on 
eliminating infringement threats posed by the new technology. Today, 
many copyright owners are partnering with major user-generated content 
platforms in order to participate in and receive compensation for some 
third-party infringement occurring on the Internet. YouTube pioneered such 
partnership arrangements in 2006 with a new kind of copyright license 
now referred to as a “second level agreement.” In 2008, YouTube unveiled 
Content ID, which streamlined the process for entering into second level 
agreements with the site. This Note analyzes Content ID and the second 
level agreements underlying it to determine how the average YouTube 
uploader is legally affected, and how the agreements square with federal 
copyright law when Content ID does not adequately safeguard against 
false ownership claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a new technology emerges that can exploit copyrighted works, 
copyright owners have three basic options: do nothing, try to eliminate the 
new kind of dissemination, or participate in it and receive compensation.1 In 
the early 2000s, copyright owners concentrated on eliminating the rising 
infringement threats posed by the Internet by shutting down file-sharing 
programs and suing the users of those programs.2 Today user-generated con-
tent (UGC) platforms3—websites like YouTube, MySpace, and Yahoo—
present an opportunity for copyright owners to participate in and receive 
compensation for some third-party exploitation occurring on the Internet.4 
Many major UGC platforms enter into licensing agreements with copy-
right owners, turning potential courtroom opponents into business partners 
with the stroke of a pen.5 Yafit Lev-Aretz coined the term “second level 
agreements” to describe these licenses in her 2012 article by the same name.6 
Lev-Aretz succinctly describes this new breed of copyright license: 
While a First Level Agreement involves the copyright owner on the one 
hand and the [UGC platform] user on the other, Second Level Agreements 
are negotiated and executed by copyright owners and platform operators. 
In other words, Second Level Agreements authorize unidentified uses of 
copyrighted content by users in UGC platforms.7 
YouTube is probably the most popular UGC platform today and pio-
neered the development of these agreements in 2006.8 The first second 
                                                                                                                         
1 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemina-
tion, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613–14 (2001). 
2 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); John Borland, RIAA 
Sues 261 File Swappers, C|NET (Sept. 8, 2003, 10:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com 
/2100-1023_3-5072564.html. 
3 “UGC is often defined as content uploaded and sometimes created by Internet users, 
rather than produced by the website itself.” Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 
45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 142 (2012). 
4 See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Some Media Companies Choose to Profit from Pirated 
YouTube Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at C1 (“After years of regarding pirated 
video on YouTube as a threat, some major media companies are having a change of 
heart, treating it instead as an advertising opportunity.”). 
5 See generally, Lev-Aretz, supra note 3. 
6 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 138–39. 
7 Id. at 152. 
8 Id. at 140, 155–56 (“YouTube was initiated in February 2005.... YouTube’s popu-
larity in its first years was mainly due to the copyrighted material users uploaded to the 
site.... Attempting to avoid lawsuits and to make YouTube a better source for profit, 
[YouTube’s parent company] Google has entered into content partnerships with various 
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level agreements were individually negotiated between YouTube and major 
music conglomerates.9 YouTube now enters into these agreements en masse 
through its popular service, Content ID.10 Content ID streamlines the contract-
ing process with a simple online form11 and implements special technology 
that automatically searches YouTube’s digital library for videos contain-
ing the copyrighted material that claimants12 provide.13 Most claimants use 
Content ID to permit otherwise infringing videos to remain on YouTube in 
exchange for a percentage of the advertising revenue the videos generate.14 
At first blush, Content ID deftly preserves the status quo on YouTube 
with minimal disruption to the visitor experience: copyright owners gain 
control over the use of their works on the site and receive compensation, 
YouTube contracts out of infringement liability, and YouTube visitors retain 
access to a variety of copyrighted content (which was largely responsible for 
the site’s early popularity15) in exchange for viewing a few advertisements. 
But this synopsis excludes one key party: the people who create and upload 
those otherwise infringing videos (the user-creators). This synopsis also fails 
to account for a phenomenon known as Content ID abuse, which occurs when 
dishonest claimants use Content ID to profit from works to which they do 
not own valid copyrights (usually public domain works).16 
This Note analyzes Content ID and the second level agreements under-
lying it to determine how the user-creator is legally affected and how the 
agreements square with federal copyright law when Content ID does not 
adequately safeguard against abuse. Part I surveys the traditional copyright 
law implications for user-creators and YouTube prior to the advent of 
                                                                                                                         
music and entertainment companies. The first Second Level Agreement took place in 
2006 ....”). 
9 Id. at 152, 156. 
10 See, e.g., Content Identification Application, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com 
/content_id_signup (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); David King, Making Money on YouTube 
with Content ID, GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008 
/08/making-money-on-youtube-with-content-id.html; Stelter, supra note 4. 
11 Content Identification Application, supra note 10. 
12 I use the term “claimant” to refer to anyone who signs up for Content ID. Usually, 
that means the bona fide owner of the copyrighted material submitted during the Content ID 
application process. See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com 
/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“YouTube only grants Content 
ID to content owners who meet specific criteria. To be approved, content owners must 
own exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded 
by the YouTube user community.”); infra Part II. But see infra Part IV. 
13 How Content ID Works, supra note 12. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155. 
16 Patrick McKay, YouTube Copyfraud & Abuse of the Content ID System, FAIR USE 
TUBE (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.fairusetube.org/youtube-copyfraud. 
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second level agreements. Part II explains how Content ID works and how 
it alters the legal framework laid out in Part I. Part III proposes that Content 
ID impliedly grants a license from the copyright owner to the user-creator. 
Part IV addresses Content ID abuse and urges YouTube to more fairly bal-
ance users’ interests by instituting up-front copyright ownership verification 
in the Content ID application process and by promulgating clear guidelines 
and penalties for abusers. 
I. LEGAL BACKDROP OF CONTENT ID 
Numa Numa17 is one of the most viewed viral Internet videos of all 
time,18 and will help illustrate the following survey of traditional copyright 
infringement liability pre–Content ID. In a low-quality home video, a teenage 
boy with the YouTube account name xloserkidx lip-synchs and performs an 
interpretive dance to O-Zone’s Romanian-language hit song, Numa Numa,19 
in what appears to be his childhood bedroom. When Numa Numa was up-
loaded in 2006, YouTube probably displayed banner advertisements across 
the top of the screen and collected all the ad revenue generated by the 
video’s hundreds of millions of views.20 Before Content ID created an in-
centive to leave the video on the site by giving copyright owners direct access 
to the ad revenue pie, O-Zone was probably reluctant to remove the video 
through prescribed statutory means21 due to other market and reputational 
concerns.22 For example, the video’s popularity may have contributed to in-
creased album sales, and the band may have worried that removing the high-
profile video would lead to a backlash from music fans.23 The chance of 
                                                                                                                         
17 xloserkidx, Numa Numa, YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=60og9gwKh1o. 
18 As of December 2006, only six months after its original upload, the video had over 
700 million views, making it the second-most viewed YouTube video at that time. See, e.g., 
Most Viral Video of All Time, MSNBC (Dec. 1, 2006, 11:12 AM), http://www.msnbc 
.msn.com/id/15958470/ns/msnbc-countdown_with_keith_olbermann/t/most-viral-video-all 
-time/; Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2006, 12:26 GMT), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm. 
19 Unless otherwise indicated, Numa Numa refers to the YouTube video, not the song 
itself. 
20 See Complaint ¶ 37, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07CV02103), 2007 WL 775611 (“[A]dvertisers pay YouTube to 
display banner advertising to users whenever they log on to, search for, and view infring-
ing videos.”). 
21 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3) (West 2013); see also infra Part IV. 
22 Assume that the band O-Zone exclusively owns all rights to the song. 
23 Music fans responded to Metallica’s aggressive campaign against peer-to-peer file 
sharing network Napster and its users in the early 2000s with the “Boycott Metallica” move-
ment. Ron Kaufman, Boycott Metallica, KILL YOUR TELEVISION (Aug. 21, 2001, 11:50 AM), 
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minimal collateral financial gain and the fear of negative press probably 
kept O-Zone from enforcing its rights to remove the video from the site 
and to sue YouTube and xloserkidx for infringement. 
This Part of the Note sets O-Zone’s incentives aside and surveys the 
copyright law landscape prior to second level agreements and Content ID. 
In other words, it considers O-Zone’s ability, not its desire, to vindicate its 
rights regarding the video prior to Content ID. Subparts A and B outline 
direct and secondary infringement liability theories. Subpart C introduces the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and explains how it limits ISP 
liability, severely curtailing O-Zone’s and other similarly situated copyright 
owners’ ability to recover from YouTube.24 Subpart D discusses Viacom 
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., which threatened to remove YouTube’s 
DMCA protection and tip the scale back into copyright owners’ favor. 
Viacom was, therefore, a major catalyst for developing Content ID, and it 
sets the stage for a thorough analysis of the service.25 
A. Direct Infringement Liability Under the Copyright Act 
At the height of Numa Numa’s popularity, O-Zone could have easily 
established prima facie claims for direct infringement against xloserkidx 
and YouTube. Section 501 of the Copyright Act provides for direct in-
fringement liability.26 Courts generally follow the two-pronged test for di-
rect infringement set out in Arnstein v. Porter,27 which requires a plaintiff to 
prove (1) “that defendant copied from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work” and 
(2) “that the copying ... constitute[d] improper appropriation.”28 Improper 
appropriation has its own two-pronged test, which requires a plaintiff to prove 
(1) “that the defendant’s work appropriated protected expression from the 
copyrighted work” and (2) “that audiences will perceive substantial similari-
ties between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s protected expression.”29 
By making a clear analog copy of the entire recording of the song in his 
video, xloserkidx satisfied both elements of infringement in a textbook-like 
                                                                                                                         
http://web.archive.org/web/20010821115030/http://www.netreach.net/~kaufman/metallica 
.html (accessed by searching for the original URL in the Internet Archive). 
24 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512. 
25 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software 
to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB118161295626932114.html. 
26 17 U.S.C.A § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copy-
right owner ... is an infringer ....”). 
27 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 9.1 n.2 (3d ed. 2005). 
28 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
29 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 9.3.1. 
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manner. YouTube satisfied both elements in a similarly straightforward 
manner when xloserkidx uploaded the video to the site because YouTube’s 
computer systems created a copy of the video—including its audio compo-
nent—to store in YouTube’s digital database.30 
B. Secondary Infringement Liability at Common Law 
O-Zone might have established prima facie claims for secondary in-
fringement against YouTube as well. Two theories of secondary infringe-
ment liability have developed at common law: vicarious and contributory.31 
Under these theories, YouTube could be liable for xloserkidx’s direct in-
fringement if certain conditions are met. 
The leading case on vicarious liability, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. 
L. Green Co., found the owner of a chain of record stores liable for direct 
infringement committed by one of its record dealers.32 Establishing vicarious 
liability requires (1) “the right and ability to supervise” and (2) “an obvious 
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge” of the direct infringement.33 
A defendant may be liable for contributory infringement if he (1) had 
actual or constructive “know[ledge] of the infringing activity” and (2) “acted 
in concert with the direct infringer—materially inducing, causing or contrib-
uting to the conduct of the direct infringer.”34 
C. Limited Liability for ISPs Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA, enacted in 1998, severely limits monetary and injunctive 
relief available to copyright owners from Internet service providers (ISPs) 
for both primary and secondary infringement.35 That is, even if O-Zone could 
establish a prima facie case of infringement against YouTube, YouTube 
could invoke DMCA protection as a defense. Title II of the DMCA,36 com-
monly referred to as the “safe harbor provision,”37 “endeavors to balance the 
                                                                                                                         
30 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom I), 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining how YouTube functions as a website). 
31 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom II), 676 F.3d 19, 28 n.5 (2d Cir. 
2012) (listing the doctrines of secondary copyright infringement); see also Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005). 
32 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
33 Id. at 307. 
34 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 8.1. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). 
35 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2013). 
36 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 512 (2012)). 
37 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff 
.org/issues/dmca (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
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interests of [ISPs] and copyright owners when copyright infringement occurs” 
on the Internet.38 It immunizes ISPs from monetary relief for certain activities 
that otherwise constitute direct, contributory, or vicarious infringement.39 
An ISP must meet several threshold requirements to enjoy safe harbor 
protection. An ISP must qualify as a “service provider” as defined in the 
DMCA.40 A qualifying ISP must implement an account termination policy 
according to the DMCA’s specifications, and must “accommodate[] and not 
interfere[] with standard technical measures.”41 An ISP that meets those gen-
eral requirements is eligible for protection for four types of activities, some 
of which carry their own additional conditions: (1) transitory digital network 
communications, (2) system caching, (3) storing information on systems or 
networks at the direction of users, and (4) information location tools.42 
YouTube qualifies as a “service provider” for purposes of the safe har-
bor as “a provider of online services or network access.”43 YouTube stores 
information at the direction of users, which is governed by § 512(c) of the 
DMCA. YouTube only qualifies for safe harbor protection for that activity 
if it: 
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in par-
agraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infring-
ing activity.44 
With this last piece of the puzzle in place, the pre–Content ID liability pic-
ture is clear: O-Zone has a strong case against xloserkidx and YouTube for 
direct infringement, O-Zone may have a prima facie case for secondary 
                                                                                                                         
38 Overview, HARVARD UNIV., http://dmca.harvard.edu/pages/overview (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2014). 
39 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 8.3.2; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504–05, 512 (West 2013). 
40 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013). 
41 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A)–(B); see also id. § 512(i)(2) (defining “standard technical mea-
sures” as certain “technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or 
protect copyrighted works ...”). 
42 Id. § 512(a)–(d). 
43 Id. § 512(k)(1)(B); Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 39. 
44 Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516–17 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C)). 
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infringement against YouTube, and the DMCA probably limits O-Zone’s 
ability to recover from YouTube under either infringement theory. 
Before Content ID, countless other copyright owners were in a similar 
position. But unlike O-Zone, some of those similarly situated copyright own-
ers laid claim to many more infringing videos on the site and had greater 
financial resources to pursue YouTube in court. On March 13, 2007, the 
international media conglomerate Viacom filed suit against YouTube and its 
parent company Google in the Southern District of New York.45 Viacom 
alleged that YouTube had fallen out of the § 512(c) safe harbor provision, 
and sought injunctive relief and at least $1 billion in damages.46 
D. Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. and the Inception of Con-
tent ID 
Viacom alleged that YouTube failed to satisfy the additional require-
ments for safe harbor protection listed in § 512(c)(1)(A) and (B).47 Viacom’s 
theory depended on a broad interpretation of the statute; namely, that 
YouTube needed only general knowledge of widespread infringing activity 
on its site to lose safe harbor protection.48 To be sure, email correspondence 
among YouTube executives evidenced a general awareness of and perhaps 
complicity in the presence of infringing videos on the site.49  
The ISP and entertainment communities followed Viacom closely, un-
sure of how the court would interpret “actual knowledge” of infringement, 
“aware[ness] of fact or circumstances” indicating infringement, and the “right 
and ability to control” user-creators.50 Although the DMCA “endeavors to 
balance the interests of [ISPs] and copyright owners,”51 the Viacom decision 
would likely represent a thumb on the scale to the affected industries. 
In Viacom I, the Southern District of New York granted YouTube’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, holding that YouTube was entitled to § 512(c) 
safe harbor protection and dismissing all infringement claims.52 In so hold-
ing, the court rejected Viacom’s view that “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence 
                                                                                                                         
45 Complaint, supra note 20, at 1. 
46 First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10, 37–39, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F. 
Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-02103 (LLS)), 2008 WL 2062868; see also 
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 148–49. 
47 Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
48 Id. at 518–19. 
49 Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 33–34. 
50 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013); see, e.g., Amir Hassanabadi, Note, 
Viacom v. YouTube—All Eyes Blind: The Limits of the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 406–07 (2011). 
51 Overview, supra note 38. 
52 Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
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of [infringing] activity in general” should disqualify YouTube from safe harbor 
protection.53 Instead, the court held that failure to comply with § 512(c)(1)(A) 
requires “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable in-
fringements of individual items.”54 The court held that disqualification under 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) also requires item specific knowledge of infringing activity 
before YouTube can be said to have the “right and ability to control” the 
infringing activity of its users.55 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Viacom II affirmed Viacom I’s inter-
pretation of § 512(c)(1)(A), but remanded the issue of whether YouTube 
had disqualifying constructive knowledge of infringement or, alternatively, 
had exercised willful blindness.56 The Second Circuit reversed Viacom I’s 
interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B), holding that an ISP’s “right and ability to 
control” infringing activity only requires a general awareness of such activity, 
and remanded the issue of whether YouTube in fact had the requisite “right 
and ability” to control such activity.57 On remand to the Southern District 
of New York, Viacom III found for YouTube on each issue and dismissed 
Viacom’s claims.58 
The Viacom cases chart the evolution of interpreting § 512(c) safe harbor 
eligibility, which is of great interest and import to the ISP community. But 
the public court battle set into motion potentially far more interesting and 
important private licensing developments. When YouTube began testing 
Content ID in 2007, a spokesperson for Google acknowledged that its devel-
opment was necessary to resolve the pending legal dispute with Viacom.59 
Because YouTube risked falling out of the safe harbor if the courts sided with 
Viacom’s statutory interpretation, YouTube needed a mechanism to appease 
copyright owners and immunize itself from infringement liability. YouTube’s 
goal was two-fold: mitigate the Viacom litigation and prevent future claims 
by other copyright owners.60 As evidence that Viacom found Content ID 
                                                                                                                         
53 Id. at 523. YouTube did not dispute that it had general awareness of infringing con-
tent residing on its network at the direction of its users. Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 28–29. 
54 Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519, 523. The opinions refer to this as “item-specific 
knowledge.” Id. at 527; Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 26, 30, 36, 42. 
55 Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
56 Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 30–32, 41–42. 
57 Id. at 35–38, 41–42. 
58 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom III), 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
59 Delaney, supra note 25 (“Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt has said that finger-
printing technology is key to resolving copyright battles between media and technology 
companies over online video, such as Viacom[,] Inc.’s $1 billion suit against Google filed 
in March. Some media executives have accused YouTube of dragging its feet in implement-
ing such technology in order to profit from copyright infringement as long as possible, a 
charge the video site has denied.”). 
60 See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155–56. 
2014] CONTRACTING IN THE DARK 315 
to be a satisfactory solution, Viacom did not seek damages for any actions 
after YouTube implemented Content ID in 2008.61 
II. CONTENT ID 
This Part of the Note outlines the nuts and bolts of YouTube and Content 
ID, serving as the bridge between the well-trodden copyright law landscape 
outlined above and the murky new world of second level agreements ex-
plored below. 
YouTube operates like most other UGC sites. Any visitor can search for 
and watch videos simply by visiting the site, but a YouTube account is re-
quired to upload videos and use some other site features, such as comment-
ing on videos and accessing mature content.62 The account is free and the 
user must agree to YouTube’s Terms of Service.63 A user can upload video 
files from her hard drive or record a video using a webcam.64 YouTube 
does not review or approve each uploaded video before making it publicly 
accessible.65 Instead, policing is more democratic: users are expected to 
use “common-sense” when uploading,66 viewers can “flag” inappropriate 
videos,67 and copyright owners can notify YouTube of infringing videos.68 
Any copyright owner may participate in Content ID, although it was orig-
inally “designed for exclusive rights holders whose content is frequently 
uploaded to YouTube by the user community.”69 In order to participate, the 
                                                                                                                         
61 Miguel Helft, Judge Sides with Google in Viacom Video Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2010, at B1. 
62 YouTube Essentials, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://wayback.archive.org 
/web/20130304213858/http://www.youtube.com/t/about_essentials (accessed by searching 
for YouTube Essentials in the Internet Archive index). 
63 Sign up for an Account on YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/you tube 
/answer/161805?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Create a New Google Account, GOOGLE, 
https://accounts.google.com/SignUp?service=youtube (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
64 How to Upload Videos, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/579 
24?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
65 Id.; see also Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.google 
.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (stating that, across all of Google’s products and services, 
“content is the sole responsibility of the entity that makes it available”). 
66 YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community 
_guidelines (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
67 Flagging Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802027 
?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
68 Copyright Infringement Notification Basics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt 
/copyright/copyright-complaint.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
69 Content ID, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20130 
106170131/http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (accessed by searching for the original 
URL in the Internet Archive). Slightly modified language appears on the current version 
of the site. See supra note 12. 
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copyright owner fills out a short form70 and delivers a reference file of the 
claimed content to YouTube.71 The copyright owner selects in advance the 
course of action to be taken when that content is identified: block, track, or 
monetize.72 Blocking makes the video unplayable or mutes the audio.73 
Tracking provides the content owner with video viewership statistics.74 
Monetizing inserts advertisements before the video or lays them over the 
video,75 and YouTube shares the generated ad revenue with the content 
owner.76 Through an automated process, using a combination of video finger-
printing technology created by Google and audio fingerprinting technology 
licensed from Audible Magic,77 Content ID scans YouTube’s library of user-
uploaded videos and applies the owner’s selected course of action whenever a 
match is found.78 A user may dispute a Content ID match if she believes it 
was an error,79 a process discussed in greater depth in Part IV. According to 
YouTube’s parent company Google, as of 2008, copyright owners opting 
into an early test version of Content ID chose to monetize ninety percent 
of claims.80  
III. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS FORMED BY CONTENT ID 
Content ID creates an express contractual nonexclusive licensing agree-
ment between YouTube and the claimant, just like the early, individually 
                                                                                                                         
70 Content Identification Application, supra note 10. 
71 How Content ID Works, supra note 12. 
72 Id.; see also Liz Gannes, From Monitor to Monetize: The Evolution of YouTube 
Content ID, GIGAOM (Sept. 28, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/09/28/from-moni 
tor-to-monetize-the-evolution-of-youtube-content-id/ (“[T]oday, YouTube’s Content ID is a 
market standard, with every major U.S. network broadcaster, movie studio, and record 
label using it …. More than 1,000 content owners have uploaded more than 1 million ref-
erence files to the system, and the majority of partners elect to leave infringing content up 
and try to monetize it ….”) (citing Over 1,000 Content Owners Now Using Content ID, 
YOUTUBE BIZ BLOG (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://ytbizblog.blogspot.com/2009/09 
/over-1000-content-owners-now-using.html. 
73 How Content ID Works, supra note 12. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., Stelter, supra note 4 (“[T]he YouTube users who post the content without 
permission will not share in the advertising revenue generated by their posts. Instead, it is 
split between the media companies and YouTube.”). 
77 Steve Chen, The State of Our Video ID Tools, GOOGLE BLOG (June 14, 2007), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/06/state-of-our-video-id-tools.html; YouTube Warn-
ing Video Taken Down, NOISE ADDICTS (Jan. 2010), http://www.noiseaddicts.com/2010 
/01/youtube-contentid-system/. 
78 How Content ID Works, supra note 12. 
79 Content ID Claim Basics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/content 
-id-disputes.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
80 King, supra note 10. 
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negotiated second level agreements between YouTube and particular major 
copyright owners.81 Content ID scans its database for reference file matches, 
meaning YouTube acquires disqualifying item specific knowledge even when 
YouTube does not profit from the infringing videos.82 Therefore, § 512(c) 
safe harbor protection is no longer available, and YouTube needs a license 
to avoid committing secondary infringement. 
The contractual relationships created by Content ID might be viewed this 
way: the copyright owner is the licensor, YouTube is the licensee, and the 
user-creator is a non-contracting party—perhaps a “tolerated” infringer or the 
beneficiary of a waiver. This Note argues that a better view is that Content 
ID creates an implied, nonexclusive, royalty-free license between the copy-
right owner and the user-creator, which is limited in scope by YouTube’s 
Terms of Service and the terms of the second level agreement. 
A. Theories of Tolerated Use and Waiver 
Because the user-creator is not an express contracting party under 
Content ID and is legally bound by YouTube’s Terms of Service, the sec-
ond level agreement might not affect her legal status at all.83 One might 
argue that the Content ID claimant is simply tolerating infringement or 
granting a waiver to users. Facially, both theories have some merit, but 
ultimately they are inappropriate. 
The term “tolerated use” was coined by Professor Tim Wu to describe 
“infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may 
be aware, yet does nothing about.”84 The copyright owner seeks neither to 
stop the activity nor to be compensated for it.85 A cursory glance at Content 
ID suggests infringing user-creators are being tolerated: a monetizing claim-
ant is at least constructively aware of infringing use, chooses to allow the 
videos to remain on YouTube when she could easily have them removed 
or blocked, and does not seek compensation from user-creators. 
Waiver is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim.86 It 
is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its 
existence and the intent to relinquish it.”87 Waiver “refers only to a decision 
not to enforce rights against a particular party.”88 There is scant case law 
                                                                                                                         
81 See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 153–54. 
82 For example, when the claimant opts to block or track videos containing their content. 
83 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 139. 
84 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008). 
85 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 138. 
86 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:154 (2013). 
87 United States v. King Features Entm’t, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1988). 
88 PATRY, supra note 86, § 5:157. 
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on the waiver doctrine, but in Courtney-Clarke v. Rizzoli International 
Publications, Inc.,89 a New York appellate court shed some light on what 
it means to express an intent to relinquish a known right. The court held 
that the Plaintiff’s intent to relinquish her known right to a royalty rate in a 
publishing agreement could not be inferred from her “mere silence, over-
sight or thoughtlessness in failing to object to the lower royalty rate she had 
been receiving.”90 Courtney-Clark suggests that opting into Content ID 
and receiving some payment from YouTube does not evidence a copyright 
owner’s intent to relinquish her right to the full value of payments due 
directly from infringing users. 
The flaw in both of the foregoing theories is that they ignore the basic 
purpose of the second level agreement: Content ID claimants only profit if 
and when users upload infringing videos. That users will infringe is a basic 
assumption of the contract. The copyright owner is not sitting on her rights 
against the user-creator in exchange for nothing or for less than optimum 
payment; she is sitting on her rights precisely so that she can maximize pay-
ment in the form of shared ad revenue. The second level agreement is a new 
licensing device developed in response to a relatively new market.91 Prior to 
Content ID, media giants actively tried to quash infringement directly by sub-
mitting individual takedown notices and indirectly by suing YouTube.92 Now 
many of those media giants are authorizing the very same infringement via 
Content ID.93 It is too formalistic to conclude that copyright owners are au-
thorizing what they consider to be secondary infringement without impliedly 
authorizing the inseparable direct infringement. Therefore, tolerated use and 
waiver are inappropriate, and the arrangement is more properly described by 
a contract theory that recognizes the user-creator as an intended beneficiary. 
B. Implied License Theory 
This Note advocates a contract theory that relies on the implied license 
doctrine. Admittedly, courts are reluctant to find implied licenses,94 but 
Content ID presents a factual scenario that lends itself well to application of 
the doctrine. The second level agreement is a radically new licensing tool oc-
cupying the edge of copyright law; therefore, it is not so radical to employ a 
licensing doctrine that also occupies the edge of the law. This subsection of 
                                                                                                                         
89 251 A.D.2d 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
90 Id. at 13. 
91 See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
92 See id. at 155, 176–77. 
93 See id. 153–55, 163. 
94 See JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.04(1) (1994). 
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the Note will argue that the guiding principles of contract law—party intent 
and equity—are best served by the implied license theory. 
In her article, Second Level Agreements, Yafit Lev-Aretz presents the 
first ever in-depth legal analysis of second level agreements.95 She highlights 
their novelty, acknowledges that they might create implied licenses between 
copyright owners and users (using Content ID as a case study), and concludes 
that their future is dim because UGC does not generate much ad revenue.96 
This Note challenges two aspects of Lev-Aretz’s analysis. First, the implied 
license theory has more merit than she gives it. Second, determining the legal 
significance of second level agreements is not irrelevant merely because of 
declining profits in the original setting for which they were created or because 
law suits are unlikely so long as they are in place. Second level agreements 
are unprecedented in the world of copyright licensing,97 and the nature of the 
Internet as an ever-evolving marketplace promises that new applications not 
yet contemplated will emerge. For those reasons, the legal significance of 
second level agreements cannot be discounted. 
In his article, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into 
Digital Copyright, John S. Sieman traces the evolution of the implied 
license doctrine and predicts that courts will extend it further to resolve 
fundamental conflicts between copyright law and Internet technology.98 
Content ID is ripe for testing the limits of the modern doctrine as applied 
to Internet technology. 
1. Effects Test 
The leading case on the traditional implied license doctrine is Effects 
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen.99 Under the Effects test, an implied nonexclusive 
license is created “when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a 
work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it 
to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee 
copy and distribute his work.”100 The Effects test contemplates direct contact 
between two parties and the creation of a new, copyrighted work. Looking 
                                                                                                                         
95 See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 138–39. 
96 Id. at 158–59, 180–82. 
97 See id. at 139 (“While licenses for the purpose of pure reproduction are common in 
copyright practice, these [second level] agreements mark the first time in copyright his-
tory that a user creates a derivative work pursuant to a license that was not granted directly 
to her.”). 
98 John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into 
Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885 (2007). 
99 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
100 Sieman, supra note 98, at 899 (citing Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 
284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Effects Assoc., Inc., 908 F.2d at 558–59. 
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at the Effects test alone, Content ID is a rough fit: there are three parties to 
the arrangement, they are not in direct contact, and the user-creator makes 
a derivative work from the licensor’s original. 
Courts have expanded the implied license doctrine beyond the Effects 
test in two ways, making the doctrine more amenable to the facts of Content 
ID.101 First, other circuits following the Effects test have placed special em-
phasis on the third prong: the licensor’s intent.102 Given the difficulty of shoe-
horning Content ID into the classic Effects test, the intent-based approach is 
more useful. Second, modern courts have been willing to modify and ex-
tend the implied license doctrine even further in cases involving “nontradi-
tional circumstances.”103 
2. Field Test 
In Field v. Google, Inc.,104 a federal district court was presented with very 
nontraditional circumstances. Plaintiff Blake Field created and copyrighted 
a number of works, put them on a website, and allowed Google to create 
cached copies of the site—and therefore his copyrighted works—by failing 
to opt out of Google’s “indexing” robot.105 Sieman explains that: 
[i]ndexing is the term used to describe how search engines collect data. 
Search engines have automated programs called “robots” (or “spiders”) 
that visit as many websites as they can discover. For each one, the robot 
copies the page onto a computer owned by the search engine and creates 
an index of all the data on the page. All of this data is then ordered so that 
when users search for the data, the search engine can find it efficiently.106 
Google provides instructions on how to opt out,107 which can be done in a 
variety of ways.108 Field admitted that he knew of the opt-out system, but 
did not use it.109 
                                                                                                                         
101 Id. at 899–901. 
102 Id. at 899 n.89 (citing John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 
F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The touchstone for finding an implied license ... is intent.”); 
Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, at 515 (calling intent “the 
determinative question”); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Without 
intent, there can be no implied license.”)). 
103 Id. at 900–01, 906–15 (discussing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) and Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006)). 
104 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
105 Sieman, supra note 98, at 906–09. 
106 Id. at 890 n.22. 
107 Block or Remove Pages Using a Robots.txt File, GOOGLE, https://support.google 
.com/webmasters/answer/156449?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
108 Sieman, supra note 98, at 907–08 nn.144–53 and accompanying text. 
109 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
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The Field court radically departed from the Effects test, establishing a 
new implied license test based on licensor conduct.110 Under the Field test, 
an implied license is created “[w]hen the copyright owner (1) ‘knows of the 
use’ and (2) ‘encourages it.’”111 “Knowledge” and “encouragement” were 
interpreted very broadly.112 The court found that Field had “knowledge” of 
Google’s use by his own admission.113 Sieman, on the other hand, charac-
terized the court’s analysis of the knowledge prong thusly: “Field satisfied the 
knowledge requirement by knowing of Google’s use of the opt-out system 
to determine what to cache and what not to cache.”114 The court found that 
Field “encouraged” the use by knowing how to opt out and failing to do 
so, thereby making “a conscious decision to permit” Google to cache his 
webpage.115 Sieman summarizes the Field test as creating the following 
rule: “[W]here a copyright owner ... knows about an opt-out system ... and 
purposely fails to opt out, an implied license is created.”116 
3. Applying the Field Test to Content ID 
Even the Field test presents a small wrinkle when applied to Content ID: 
Field involved only two parties, whereas second level agreements involve 
three parties. But this wrinkle can be ironed out with the fact that privity is not 
required to create an implied license.117 Even if the second level agreement’s 
terms purport to exclude the user-creator, the agreement grants rights to 
YouTube that are inseparable from the user’s content.118 That is, copyright 
owners authorize YouTube to display and perform user-created derivative 
works. Because privity is not required to create an implied license, the fact 
that the copyright owner communicates directly only with YouTube when 
she opts into Content ID does not preclude the grant of an implied license to 
allegedly infringing user-creators.119 Accordingly, Content ID should be ana-
lyzed under the Field test, using evidence of both contracting parties’ con-
duct toward the user-creator. 
                                                                                                                         
110 See Sieman, supra note 98, at 912. 
111 See id. at 912 (quoting Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 913. 
114 Id. at 914. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 NASCAR, Inc. v. Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d 515, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 184 
F. App’x 270 (3d Cir. 2006) (“This court can find no case that injects a privity requirement 
into the implied license doctrine, and it declines to be the first to do so.”); MELVILLE 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3–10 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03, n.70 (2012). 
118 See Sieman, supra note 98, at 914–15 (“The burden to opt out is on the copyright 
owner—if he does not, the use will be allowed by an implied license.”). 
119 See Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 117. 
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The agreements between YouTube and copyright owners are opaque; 
users can only divine the terms of these agreements from a few press re-
leases and media reports.120 Users are legally bound by YouTube’s Terms 
of Service,121 which do not reflect the existence of second level agree-
ments.122 For example, YouTube’s Terms of Service prohibit uploaders, 
without qualification, from uploading videos containing copyrighted mate-
rials that they have not been authorized to use.123 
Despite such unequivocal language, YouTube’s conduct absolutely re-
flects second level agreements because user videos containing “unauthorized” 
copyrighted material are treated differently depending on whether that mate-
rial is in the Content ID system.124 Even without opting into Content ID, a 
copyright owner may notify YouTube of an infringing video and have it 
blocked.125 The user will be notified that her video was identified as infring-
ing, and she will receive a “copyright strike” on her YouTube account.126 If 
a user accumulates three copyright strikes, her account and all the videos 
uploaded under that account will be removed.127 On the other hand, users 
do not receive copyright strikes for videos matched through Content ID, no 
matter which option the claimant selected.128 YouTube’s Help guide even 
explains: “Copyright strikes are often confused with Content ID matches, 
which can result in a video being blocked. They are not the same.”129 In 
other words, a video affected by Content ID does not carry the same account 
penalties threatened by YouTube’s Terms of Service. Moreover, the user 
receives some notification that the video has been matched using Content 
ID, affirmatively telling her that YouTube and the copyright owner have 
detected the video. There can be no inference that the lack of reprimand is 
merely because the video has gone unnoticed by interested parties. All of 
this conduct would lead the user to reasonably infer that despite what the 
Terms of Service declare, it is sometimes acceptable to upload copyrighted 
material that she has not personally acquired permission to use.130 
                                                                                                                         
120 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 139. 
121 Terms of Service, YOUTUBE ¶ 1, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2014). 
122 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 139; see also Terms of Service, supra note 121. 
123 Terms of Service, supra note 121, ¶ 6. 
124 How Content ID Works, supra note 12. 
125 Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer 
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In light of the foregoing, the monetizing claimant satisfies the Field test. 
The claimant’s knowledge of YouTube users’ use can be inferred from her 
decision to opt into Content ID. After all, YouTube is adamant that Con-
tent ID is appropriate for those who hold “exclusive rights to a substantial 
body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the YouTube user 
community.”131 Monetizing claimants particularly encourage fraudulent use 
by knowing how to opt out—either by filing claims against individual videos, 
which would result in copyright strikes, or by selecting “block” under 
Content ID—and failing to do so, thereby making a “conscious decision to 
permit” users’ use.132 
The scope of the implied license of course should be limited by 
YouTube’s Terms of Service and the information YouTube reveals about 
Content ID to users on its website. For example, YouTube’s help guide alerts 
users that a Content ID claimant “may change the policy being applied to 
your video at any time.”133 
IV. CONTENT ID ABUSE 
Content ID is an effort by major industry players to contract around 
federal copyright law. Copyright and contract law have “long co-existed 
symbiotically.”134 In the last fifteen years, however, courts and commentators 
have debated the enforceability of contractual license terms that “alter the 
‘delicate balance’ of rights that the Copyright Act strikes between owners 
and users of works of authorship.”135 The second level agreement is an un-
precedented form of copyright license because the user-creator is not a party 
to the license.136 Courts have been unreceptive to preemption of contract 
claims,137 but the common rationale for courts’ reticence might not insulate 
the exotic, new second level agreement. 
                                                                                                                         
131 How Content ID Works, supra note 12; see also Qualifying for Content ID, 
YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) 
(“Content ID acceptance is based on an evaluation of each applicant’s actual need for the 
tools.… Content ID applicants may be rejected if other tools better suit their needs.”). 
132 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006). 
133 Determine What Happened to Your Video, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com 
/youtube/answer/2818443?hl=en-GB (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
134 Deanna L. Kwong, The Copyright-Contract Intersection: Softman Products Co. v. 
Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 
349 n.1 and accompanying text (2003) (citing Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: 
The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
827, 829 (1998) (“Contract and intellectual property law have always co-existed, not only 
peacefully, but [also] in an aggressive interaction between mutually supportive fields.”)). 
135 Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 
616 (2008). 
136 See supra note 97. 
137 Bohannan, supra note 135, at 618 (“[C]ourts virtually never preempt these contracts, 
no matter how much their terms conflict with the [Copyright] Act’s provisions.”). 
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Persistent Content ID abuse casts doubt on whether Content ID squares 
with federal copyright policy. Content ID does not seem to conflict with 
copyright policy when it comes to limiting YouTube’s secondary infringe-
ment liability. The DMCA138 was intended in part to balance the interests of 
copyright owners and ISPs with regard to secondary liability. It is reason-
able to view the DMCA as a set of default rules, which parties ought to be 
free to contract around.139 However, Content ID abuse does seem to conflict 
with copyright policy when it comes to balancing the interests of authors 
(copyright owners) and future creators (users). Content ID abuse refers to 
intentionally false Content ID claims, often of public domain works.140 
False claimants can monopolize and profit from works on YouTube that 
they do not actually own.141 Because Content ID lacks front-end copyright 
ownership verification and operates outside of the copyright statutes unless 
and until a user disputes a claim,142 claimants can acquire temporary con-
tractual rights to monopolize and profit from works in the public domain. 
YouTube’s dispute process ultimately defers to the DMCA, which generally 
halts abusive claims.143 But without front-end copyright ownership verifica-
tion, Content ID creates a marketplace in which individuals can monopolize 
public domain works in direct contravention of federal copyright law. 
Most inaccurate Content ID matches flow from two fundamental flaws 
in the Content ID system. The first flaw is technological: over-filtering. In a 
nutshell, over-filtering is a false positive.144 Although a pet peeve of users, it 
is grudgingly tolerated because Content ID’s software, like all software, is 
not infallible. The second flaw is procedural: Content ID abuse. Content ID 
claimants need not prove copyright ownership in the application process, 
allowing unscrupulous parties to lay claim to whatever materials they wish.145 
Public domain works are the false claim of choice among documented, repeat 
abusers.146 Content ID abuse is less tolerated by users because YouTube 
                                                                                                                         
138 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 512); Overview, supra note 38. 
139 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and 
Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 854–57 (1998). 
140 See, e.g., McKay, supra note 16. 
141 Id. (“While it seems obvious that a system which allows alleged copyright owners 
to upload any audio/visual work and claim copyright ownership over that work should at 
minimum require that person to provide some documentation of proof that they own the 
copyright to each work they claim, anecdotal evidence suggests that no such proof is in 
fact required.”).  
142 See Sieman, supra note 98, at 898–900. 
143 See Content ID Claim Basics, supra note 79. 
144 See McKay, supra note 16. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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could eliminate it by implementing front-end verification, but simply chooses 
not to. 
Regardless of whether an inaccurate Content ID match flows from over-
filtering or from abuse, the real aggrieved party is the user whose non-
infringing video is improperly blocked or monetized. Accordingly, Content 
ID arguably clashes with some of copyright law’s core goals: balancing the 
interests of authors and future creators and protecting free use of public 
domain works.147 There is no common law theory to cure this conflict. It 
can only be remedied by modifications to Content ID’s application process 
and policies. This Part of the Note explains how Content ID’s dispute pro-
cess works, why it alone is not enough to cure the conflict with federal 
copyright law, and what steps YouTube should take to cure the conflict. 
A. Content ID Dispute Process 
1.  As a Solution to Over-Filtering 
Content ID’s dispute process is a sensible solution to the over-filtering 
problem and upholds copyright policy. To understand why, a brief explana-
tion of the dispute process—especially the recent changes to it—is necessary. 
In October 2012, YouTube announced its much-anticipated reforms to 
the Content ID dispute process.148 The old process was roundly criticized in 
tech blogs and the YouTube help forum.149 It effectively circumvented the 
DMCA notice-and-takedown process, trapping users in a back-and-forth that 
gave Content ID claimants the last word. The user filed a dispute, the Content 
ID claimant could “confirm” her claim to the video, and that was the end of 
it.150 Because there is no statutory right to upload or monetize videos online, 
this was certainly a bad business practice, but not illegal.151 The reform is 
arguably an attempt by YouTube to balance users’ interests under Content ID 
and it aligns Content ID more closely with copyright policy. 
The new dispute process replaces unilateral “confirmation” with a formal 
DMCA notice-and-takedown claim.152 Now YouTube defers to user dis-
putes, giving the claimant two options: release the Content ID claim or file 
an official DMCA notification to override the dispute.153 The new process 
                                                                                                                         
147 See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 135, at 616–17.  
148 Thabet Alfishawi, Improving Content ID, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2012/10/improving-content-id.html. 
149 See, e.g., McKay, supra note 16. 
150 Id. 
151 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 177–78. 
152 Appealing Rejected Content ID Disputes, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com 
/youtube/answer/2770411 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
153 Id. 
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injects human review into the system, providing a cost-effective remedy to 
the over-filtering problem, which appears to be a genuine limitation of mod-
ern filtering technology. In other words, imperfect technology is to blame 
for over-filtering, and the new dispute process relies on honest claimants and 
users to police innocent, technological errors. Requiring copyright owners 
and users to be the first line of defense against over-filtering maintains the 
DMCA’s policy against over-burdening ISPs with policing copyrighted 
content on their sites.154 
2. As a Solution to Abuse 
The dispute process is not as sensible a solution to the false claim prob-
lem. Unlike over-filtering, false claims need not be dealt with on a video-by-
video basis. Over-filtering requires human review to assess why Content ID 
matched a particular video and whether the match is justified. In contrast, 
matches arising from false claims are unjustified in every case. 
In the case of Content ID abuse, the underlying second level agreement 
is unenforceable because the claimant purports to convey rights to YouTube 
that it does not own. It is not, therefore, a classic preemption issue, which 
would involve a true licensor attempting to expand its monopoly or restrict 
licensee rights in a way that contradicts federal copyright law.155 If the con-
cern was the harm to YouTube, the remedy would almost certainly be a 
matter of contract law.156 But the concern is the harm to users, in the form of 
time spent disputing false claims and money lost from an inability to mone-
tize non-infringing videos. Applying principles of equity, a court might be 
willing to invalidate the entire second level agreement scheme due to its po-
tential to exert control over non-negotiating parties in contravention of fed-
eral copyright policy. 
Courts have been unreceptive to preemption of contract claims, reason-
ing “that because contracts contain an element of agreement and bind only 
those in privity, contract claims are qualitatively different from copyright 
claims.”157 Second level agreements, if found to create an implied license 
between the copyright owner and the user-creator, may risk preemption be-
cause they affect a third party not in privity with any party to the express 
agreement. If YouTube wants to prevent Content ID from becoming a test 
                                                                                                                         
154 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2013); see also supra Part I.C. 
155 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 139, at 861–63. 
156 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes 
of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 259, 270–71 (1994); Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1094 (2006). 
157 Bohannan, supra note 135, at 618. 
2014] CONTRACTING IN THE DARK 327 
case for invalidating second level agreements on preemption grounds, it 
should proactively correct the interest imbalance its system creates. Specifi-
cally, false claims should be weeded out on the front-end and there should 
be clearly delineated consequences for abusers. 
B. Proposed Changes to Content ID 
One reason YouTube has been hesitant to fix Content ID abuse may be 
the obvious conflict of interest: YouTube stands to gain more from main-
taining a claimant-friendly application procedure. Pursuing false claimants 
to recover shared revenue already paid out or creating barriers on the front 
end to prevent false claims in the first place will probably result in a net loss 
for YouTube. YouTube evidently considers front-end verification to be too 
costly and prefers to rely solely on its dispute process, as it is legally entitled 
to do. 
Despite strict verification requirements for other modes of monetiza-
tion,158 YouTube evidently believes the honor system is sufficient to regu-
late Content ID. Against the backdrop of its creation outlined in this Note, 
this is not surprising. Content ID was designed to convert potential courtroom 
opponents into allies as quickly and easily as possible. Its central purpose 
is to limit YouTube’s liability, and because users have no readily apparent 
cause of action against YouTube for paying false claimants, YouTube has 
no economic impetus to guard against such abuse. In YouTube’s defense, 
the site’s economic model compels this result: users can upload and consume 
unlimited videos free of charge, and the legal protection and ad revenue 
YouTube receives from partnering with copyright owners through Content 
ID powers the machine. YouTube’s enormous user base159 means that those 
comparatively few affected users who vote with their feet and leave the site 
cannot threaten its continued operation. But second level agreements are 
yet untested, and YouTube should avoid knowingly contravening federal 
copyright policy if it wants to maintain the status quo.  
Two changes to Content ID would close the loophole, bringing the ser-
vice into harmony with federal copyright law. First, YouTube should require 
proof of copyright registration in the Content ID application process. This 
could be as simple as entering a U.S. or international registration number. 
Because Content ID was originally “designed for exclusive rights holders 
                                                                                                                         
158 McKay, supra note 16 (“YouTube has quite stringent copyright verification pro-
cedures for users wishing to qualify for partnership status and monetize the videos on their 
channel.”). 
159 Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155 (“[As of 2012], YouTube is the world’s largest re-
pository for video clips on the Internet, with over 48 hours of video uploaded to YouTube 
every 60 seconds and hundreds of millions of videos watched every day.”).  
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whose content is frequently uploaded to YouTube by the user community,” 
this would not be an onerous requirement for many claimants.160 YouTube 
could conduct automated searches for each claim using online databases. 
Second, YouTube needs to articulate a clear policy for Content ID 
abusers. Currently, YouTube’s website meekly and vaguely warns potential 
Content ID claimants: “Content owners who repeatedly make erroneous 
claims can have their Content ID access disabled and their partnership with 
YouTube terminated.”161 When a user disputes a match because she be-
lieves an abuser has claimed a public domain work, YouTube should con-
duct a registration search. If indeed the claim was abusive, YouTube should 
automatically release that claim from the Content ID system—not just 
from the disputed video—and give that claimant a “copyright strike.” If a 
claimant receives three strikes, her YouTube account should be terminated 
and she should be permanently blocked from partnering with Content ID. 
An unscrupulous claimant could, with some effort, set up a new account and 
seek Content ID partnership using a different name, IP address, email ad-
dress, and bank account information. Many of the biggest abusers, however, 
act as Content ID clearinghouses for a large number of genuine copyright 
owners.162 The burden of re-filing a long list of genuine claims after part-
nership termination hopefully would be a sufficient inconvenience to the 
businesses to curb the practice of making false claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Because second level agreements diminish the need for copyright owners 
to resort to litigation over UGC platforms, Lev-Aretz argues there is no prac-
tical need to determine the legal contours of these exotic, new contracts.163 
But the Internet and second level agreements will continue to evolve, and 
the economic model will probably continue to encourage the expressly con-
tracting parties to look out for their interests alone. The phenomenon of sec-
ond level agreements—the first arrangement in copyright history whereby 
“a user creates a derivative work pursuant to a license that was not granted 
directly to her”164—may remain isolated on UGC platforms, and its impact 
on the average UGC platform user may decline, exactly as Lev-Aretz pre-
dicts.165 But the phenomenon may evolve and expand, and the agreement’s 
legal contours eventually will be tested in court. 
                                                                                                                         
160 Content ID, supra note 69. 
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Not knowing how the agreements will be tested, this Note highlights the 
main legal issues that the agreements raise in the Content ID context. The 
express contracting parties should be prepared for courts to find that the 
third party creator cannot be legally excluded from a license. The expressly 
contracting parties should also be prepared for a court to invalidate a con-
tract formation system that turns a blind eye to contraventions of federal 
copyright policy in the name of making fast money. 
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began to search for new revenue generators in the form of professionally produced con-
tent and the importance of UGC in the licensing priority has diminished.”). 
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